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I 
We have no absolutely conclusive evidence that 
there is a physical world and we have no ab-
solutely conclusive evidence either that we ex-
ist. But we have good inductive evidence for 
both assumptions.' 
I once received a letter from an eminent logi-
cian, Mrs. Christina Ladd Franklin, saying that 
she was a solipsist and was surprised there were 
no others.* 
This paper will examine the problem of why it is 
that philosophers tend to say such strange things. 
Philosophy is perhaps most closely associated in the 
minds of those who have had a passing acquaintance with 
the subject with the problems of the existence of the 
external world and of other minds. It is not terribly 
surprising, then, that philosophers have had a reputa-
tion for becoming involved in trivial and inconsequen-
tial issues. Philosophers, of course, remain convinced 
of the seriousness of their work and appear to be quite 
willing to endure a lack of understanding on the part 
of the general public, perhaps believing the contempt 
of the mob to be the price of genius. And yet, we 
sometimes find philosophers saying things that are so 
extremely odd, if not downright silly, that we might 
feel that perhaps there is something to the suspicions 
of the public. 
Since the time of Descartes, who can truly be said 
to be the father of a good many epistemological prob-
lems that are still with us, there has been a tendency 
for philosophers to view justification primarily as a 
private activity and only secondarily as a public or 
social activity. This is a fundamental error that 
gives rise to such traditional staples of epistemology 
as the problem of the existence of the external world, 
the problem of other minds, and to such positions as 
those expressed in the above quotations. 
In what follows it will be attempted (1) to illus-
trate how the belief that justification is primarily a 
private activity arises, (2) to show how this belief 
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can generate the above-mentioned problems and posi-
tions, and (3) to show how this belief, and the prob-
lems engendered by it, can be avoided by paying careful 
attention to how our ability to justify beliefs 
originates. 
An examination of justification should be careful 
to sort out three separate although interrelated is-
sues: What is justification? How is it used? What is 
its origin? This paper will concentrate upon the last 
question in the belief that learning about the origin 
of justification will serve to shed light on what it 
is. 
II 
The first task, to illustrate how the belief that 
justification is primarily a private activity arises, 
can be approached by taking a closer look at the three 
elements in the traditional analysis, of knowledge as 
justified true belief.' 
The first element, belief, is subjective. By this 
it is not meant that belief is purely subjective in the 
sense that it is somehow totally independent of exter-
nal reality. Obviously, a belief is a belief about 
something and in this sense at the very least it is re-
lated to something external somewhere along the line, 
if not immediately. Rather, what is meant is that be-
lief is a condition, a state, of a knower. It is an 
attribute of a person, a subject. 
The second element, truth, is objective. By this 
we mean simply that whatever it is that makes a state-
ment true is somehow independent of the consciousness 
of the individual knower.1* Most philosophers would 
agree that truth, considered abstractly and absolutely, 
is conceived of as something the would-be knower 
strives after and does not create by himself. It is in 
this rather simple sense that we call truth 'objective' 
and this should not be a controversial point.* 
The third element in knowledge is justification. A 
general formula for justification is that S is com-
pletely justified in believing that p if he has evi-
dence e which entail p. But it is rather difficult to 
point out the exact character of justification all at 
once. For justification seems to have both public and 
private aspects. The public aspects of justification 
are obvious enough. We make a knowledge claim to an-
other person or to a group of persons and if it is 
challenged we attempt to justify our knowledge claim. 
This happens frequently enough so that the public as-
pect of justification should be obvious to all. 
But what of the private aspect of justification? 
Clearly we have occasion to justify our knowledge 
claims to other people. It is just as clear that we do 
not ordinarily make knowledge claims to ourselves and 
then demand justifications. Indeed, we do not make 
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knowledge claims to ourselves at all, we simply know 
things. 
But do we ever justify anything to ourselves? 
Certainly we do. While we do not make or justify 
knowledge claims to ourselves, we do justify to our-
selves propositions which are candidates for belief. 
There are numerous examples of this, such as the hunter 
by himself in the woods trying to determine if the 
tracks he sees are those of the animal he is hunting. 
Whenever a person is alone and checks, without consult-
ing others, to see if he has reached the true solution 
to a particular problem or when a scientist goes over 
the results of an experiment by himself to see if he 
really has made a discovery, we have an instance of 
private justification. The subjective and private as-
pect of justification, then, is no less real than the 
social and public aspect. 
But, granted that justification has both public and 
private aspects, we are faced with the problem of de-
termining which aspect is prior. The problem comes 
down to this: Is justification primarily a private, 
subjective activity and only secondarily a public, 
social one, or vice versa? Does justification origin-
ate in individuals or does it originate only in a so-
cial context? 
Now in the introduction it was stated that many of 
the traditional problems of epistemology can arise from 
viewing justification primarily as a private activity 
and only secondarily as a public activity. The activ-
ity of private justification is viewed as being somehow 
prior to the public justification of a knowledge claim. 
In this section we wish to illustrate, through an exam-
ination of the elements of the traditional analysis of 
knowledge, how this belief can arise. So let us now 
proceed to attempt to reconstruct the general lines of 
reasoning that can lead philosophers to this con-
clusion. Keith Lehrer, one of the foremost proponents 
of the sceptical position in contemporary epistemology, 
provides us with a number of statements with which we 
can construct arguments for the fundamentally private 
nature of justification. 
It seems to be the case that justification must be 
primarily a private activity, for at least two reasons. 
The first is that justification depends upon evidence 
and the apprehension of evidence looks to be a private 
matter. It is simply true as a matter of fact that 
some people notice things and others do not. Thus, 
even where the access to evidence is public, its ac-
quisition—noticing it--is basically a private ac-
tivity. Now since justification depends upon evidence, 
and since noticing evidence would seem to be a private 
activity, justification itself would also be a private 
activity. Lehrer has emphasized the central role of 
evidence in justification and explicitly points out the 
variation in the apprehension of evidence: 
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When we say that S is completely justified, we 
shall mean that if his belief is based upon evi-
dence, then he is completely justified by the 
evidence he has in believing that p. Thus, that 
I am completely justified in believing that p by 
the evidence that I have does not by itself war-
rant my saying that another is completely justi-
fied in his belief that p. He too must have evi-
dence which completely justifies his belief be-
fore he is, in the required sense, completely 
justified in believing that p.* 
The second reason why justification would seem to 
be primarily a private activity is that justification 
deals exclusively with beliefs. For something to be 
taken as evidence we must give assent to it, i.e., we 
must believe it. What we do in justification, then, is 
to relate propositions to our other beliefs. This 
holds true for both of the theories of justification 
that Lehrer discusses in his book, Knowledge: 
The first (theory) assumes, with the correspon-
dence theory (of truth), that there are certain 
basic facts, and that all beliefs that are justi-
fied are so by their relation to those facts. 
Beliefs concerning basic facts are basic beliefs. 
All other beliefs are justified in terms of basic 
beliefs . . . . The second kind (of theory) . . . 
posits that the justification of beliefs depends 
only upon relations betv/een beliefs in some sys-
tem of beliefs none of which is basic. 7 
In both therories, then, justification is a matter 
of relations among beliefs. Lehrer later goes on to 
assert that in all cases, including social situations, 
a person can justify his beliefs only by appealing to 
other beliefs: 
In whatever way a man might attempt to justify 
his beliefs, whether by himself or to another, he 
must always appeal to some belief. There is 
nothing other than one's belief to which one can 
appeal in the justification of belief.* 
Now since in ail cases justification deals with be-
liefs and since belief, as we have s e e r i , is a subjec-
tive element in knowledge, justificaticn will appear to 
be primarily a private activity. 
We have now seen how the belief t: at justification 
is primarily a private activity ari.as . The basic 
paradigm is the following: a perso:. forms a belief, 
justifies it to himself in some way, publicly makes a 
knowledge claim, and, if his claim is challenged or if 
circumstances otherwise require it, he reproduces his 
private justification for others. It cannot be denied 
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that this is very often the case. In fact, part of the 
plausibility of the position that justification is pri-
marily a private activity stems from the fact that this 
paradigm does indeed represent the usual way in which 
knowledge is advanced. The real danger lies in taking 
this to be the universal paradigm for knowing. This 
will be discussed in the fourth section of this paper. 
Now we must take a look at how this paradigm generates 
the traditional problems of epistemology. 
Ill 
We have taken an analysis of knowledge as justified 
true belief as a starting point and have, for the sake 
of argument, adopted the position that justification is 
primarily a private, subjective activity. Taking this 
as a universal paradigm for knowledge, a person must 
now justify to himself and 'on his own' all his beliefs 
before he can legitimately make any knowledge claims 
regarding them. It is quite easy to see how the tradi-
tional problems of epistemology arise in the context of 
such a project. For one thing, the would-be knower is 
working with beliefs and justification. Since in the 
analysis of knowledge we are considering these are sub-
jective elements, the person is trapped in a 'circle of 
subjectivity' with no clear way out. He is always of 
necessity dealing with private 'material*. Lehrer ex-
plicitly embraces this view: 
There is no exit from the circle of one's be-
liefs. This might not seem obvious. It might, 
for instance, seem that one can appeal directly 
to experience, or the testimony of others, to 
justify one's beliefs. But this is illusory. 
Sense experience, whether commonly casual or 
carefully controlled, always leaves open the 
question of what we are to believe. The prick of 
sense often elicits ready consent, but what we 
believe in the face of sensory stimulation de-
pends on our antecedent convictions.' 
Since the communication of information is such an 
important part of human experience, this private jus-
tification of all our knowledge claims is of the utmost 
importance to philosophy. We are thus placed in a sit-
uation not too dissimilar to that of Descartes at the 
beginning of the Meditations. 
In fairness to Descartes, it should be said that 
given the presuppositions of his rationalism, his pro-
gram makes perfectly good sense. For if the world is a 
system of necessarily related events, then simply by 
knowing one event--the cogito—one can in theory, by 
just tracing its relations to other events, finally 
come to a knowledge of the entire system of events. 
What is amazing is that long after the presuppositions 
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of rationalism have been abandoned philosophers are 
still following in the footsteps of Descartes and en-
countering the same problems, the existence of the 
self, of the external world, and of other minds, that 
he encountered. This is an indication not so much of 
the enduring influence of Descartes, although that 
should not be underestimated, as it is of the continu-
ing appeal of the conception of science as a system of 
interrelated truths founded upon a basic truth. 
But once we have to justify all our knowledge 
claims, we will learn by experience to make very few. 
Consider, for example, A. J. Ayer's well-known comments 
on the Cartesian cogito: 
But even if it were true that such a proposition 
as 'there is a thought new' was logically cer-
tain, it still would not serve Descartes' pur-
pose. For if 'cogito' is taken in this sense, 
his initial principle, 'cogito ergo sum,' is 
false. 'I exist' does not follow from 'there is 
a thought now'. The fact that a thought occurs 
at any given moment does not entail that any 
other thought has occurred at . :iy other moment, 
still less that there has occun-.-d a series of 
thought sufficient to constitute a single self. 1 0 
The validity of the deductions that Descartes makes 
from the cogito have rightly been subject to attack. 
But some philosophers have gone on to maintain that we 
cannot know that we exist. Hans Reichenbach, for exam-
ple, concluded that the existence of the self is what 
he terms a 'posit', an assumption that we make on the 
basis of good inductive evidence that is not absolutely 
conclusive. 1 1 Of course, if there are problems with 
the existence of the self (apart from the very real 
problem of the nature of the self) then there must also 
be problems with the existence of the external world 
and the existence of other minds for the would-be 
knower. We can now see that when one views justifica-
tion as primarily a private activity the traditional 
problems of epistemology arise. Now we must see if 
there is any way in which they can be avoided. 
IV 
The belief that justification is primarily private 
and the problems this belief generates can be avoided 
if we pay close attention to the activity we call jus-
tifying. In his review of Lehrer's Knowledge, Alan 
White points out an important distinction. Here White 
claims that Lehrer 
. . slides—at first implicitly . . . and then 
explicitly . . .--from an examination of the con-
ditions for someone's having knowledge to an ex-
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amination of the condition for someone's claim to 
have knowledge to be justified. 1 2 
This distinction between knowing and claiming to 
know is very important for the matter we are consid-
ering. For there are situations in which we would say 
that a person knows something and yet is unable to 
justify a claim to know. An obvious example would be 
an infant knowing her mother. This distinction would 
seem to suggest that justification is more pertinent to 
claiming to know than to knowing proper. This is im-
portant because claiming to know is something that al-
ways occurs in a social context. Once again, we do not 
make knowledge claims to ourselves, we simply know 
things. We will return to this point later. 
In trying to discover exactly what justification 
is, we can use Gilbert Kyle's distinction between know-
ing that and knowing how. 1 1 It may be objected that 
even granted that justification presupposes a knowing 
how, it is something we somehow 'intuit' how to do or 
that it is a natural human ability like breathing or 
walking and that everyone who has the ability does it 
with pretty much the same degree of competence. But 
this is obviously not the case. Some people have dif-
ficulty articulating their beliefs, let alone organiz-
ing and relating them in complex patterns or supporting 
them with relevant evidence. Being able to justify, 
then, is clearly a skill. 
The question which must now be asked is, 'What is 
the origin of this skill? How do we develop it?' A 
clue comes from Wilfrid Sellars. Discussing the origin 
of concepts referring to inner episodes, he states that 
they are intersubjective, in other words, that we get 
them from other people in a social situation.'* Now if 
the very activity that we call justifying is intersub-
jective in its origin, then it follows that the ex-
istence of this activity presupposes the existence at 
some time of a community whose members make knowledge 
claims. The existence of such a community of people is 
a necessary condition for the existence of the activity 
of justifying. A theory of justification, then, may 
correctly begin by recognizing the existence of such a 
community as an eminently reasonable presupposition. > s 
We are now in a position to indicate what justifi-
cation is. Justification has public and private as-
pects but its origin is intersubjective. As such, it 
is primarily a social activity. Before we can know 
that a belief is justified, we must know how to go a-
bout justifying it and knowing how to justify some-
thing, i.e., how to relate a belief to other beliefs by 
articulating them and arranging them or how to support 
a belief by appeal to relevant evidence, is a skill, 
something we learn how to do, something we acquire as 
members of an epistemic community. Once we learn how 
to justify our beliefs through observing other people 
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performing justifications, we internalize the process 
and perform private justifications either in anticipa-
tion of a public demand for them or for our own satis-
faction. '• 
The two arguments given for the fundamentally pri-
vate nature of justification can be dismissed. With 
regard to the first, it is quite true that noticing ev-
idence is something that is private, but we learn how 
to notice things--how to be observant, how to focus our 
attention—from other people who point things out to 
us, show us what to look for. The second argument 
states that justification deals exclusively with be-
liefs. But how to organize and support beliefs by ev-
idence is something that we clearly pick up in a social 
context. One must always be careful to distinguish 
between the way we justify and the way in which we 
learn to justify if the social nature of justification 
is to be made clear. 
On the view that justification is primarily a so-
cial activity, it follows that the existence of justi-
fication presupposes a community of people who claim to 
know. The demand to justify the presuppositions of 
justification is clearly an unreasonable one. Thus, 
attempting to justify belief in the existence of the 
self, the external world, other minds, or an epistemic 
community is mistaken. These facts are known without 
need for justification. Problems and scepticism con-
cerning these facts arise when philosophers ignore the 
practical limits of the concept of justification. They 
will disappear when philosophers recognize these limits 
and obey them. 1 7 
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